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Note
You Should Be Free To Talk the Talk and Walk
the Walk: Applying Riley v. California to Smart
Activity Trackers
Katharine Saphner
Are you one of the millions of Americans tracking their
bodily movements with a smart activity tracker produced by
1
Fitbit, Jawbone, Nike, or their competitors? These activity
2
trackers come in a variety of forms, such as wristbands, clip-on
3
4
5
devices, shoe inserts, and shirts. They collect data on steps
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1. Tony Danova, Just 3.3 Million Fitness Trackers Were Sold in the US
in the Past Year, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/33-million-fitness-trackers-were-sold-in-the-us-in-the
-past-year-2014-5 (indicating that 3.3 million activity trackers were sold between April 2013 and March 2014).
2. See, e.g., Flex, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/flex (last visited Mar. 7,
2016); Nike + Fuelband, NIKE, https://secure-nikeplus.nike.com/plus/products/
fuelband (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Up, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
3. See, e.g., One, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/one (last visited Mar. 7,
2016); Zip, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/zip (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
4. See, e.g., Alice Truong, Forget Clip-on Trackers and Wristbands: This
Smart Shoe Insole Will Track Your Physical Activity, FASTCOMPANY (Apr. 15,
2014, 8:27 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3029051/world-changing-ideas/
forget-clip-on-trackers-and-wristbands-this-smart-shoe-insole-will-trac
(describing a smart sole insert created by SmartMove).
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taken, flights of stairs climbed, calories burned, efficiency of
9
10
11
sleep, GPS location, and heart rate and respiratory activity.
If you are an activity tracker user, perhaps you bought your
tracker in an effort to stay on top of your health, or maybe your
employer gave it to you as part of a workplace health initia12
tive. Now suppose that you are arrested. As the arresting officer pats you down to search for weapons, he finds the Fitbit
13
Charge HR on your wrist. May the officer lawfully toggle
through your daily fitness statistics without a warrant?
As time passes, this question becomes more pressing.
American society has embraced wearable technology. Smart activity trackers are becoming more ubiquitous each year, with
14
sales increasing 500% annually over the last several years,
15
and further growth expected in the future. Wearers indicate
that when these trackers are worn all day, every day, they
cease to feel like an accessory; they become an extension of the
5. See, e.g., Robert Vamosi, Hexoskin’s On a Mission To Change Personal
Health Management, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/robertvamosi/2014/10/10/hexoskins-on-a-mission-to-change
-personal-health-management (discussing clothing that collects health data);
Hexoskin Wearable Body Metrics, HEXOSKIN, http://www.hexoskin.com (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
6. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3; Up, supra note 2; Zip,
supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3; Up, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Forerunner® 10, GARMIN, https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/
into-sports/running/forerunner-10/prod107143.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016);
Surge, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/surge (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
11. Charge HR, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/chargehr (last visited Mar.
7, 2016); Fitbit Blaze, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/blaze (last visited Mar. 7,
2016); Vamosi, supra note 5.
12. Employers seeking to increase productivity and decrease healthcare
costs see activity trackers as “quick wins.” Andrea Davis, Wearable Devices:
Future of Wellness or Just a Fad?, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014,
9:31 AM), http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/ebn_hc_wellness_disease/wearable
-devices-just-a-fad-or-the-future-of-wellness-2744272-1.html.
13. Charge HR, supra note 11.
14. Danova, supra note 1 (providing statistics on wearable fitness tracker
sales).
15. See Worldwide Wearable Computing Market Gains Momentum with
Shipments Reaching 19.2 Million in 2014 and Climbing to Nearly 112 Million
in 2018, Says IDC, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www
.businesswire.com/news/home/20140410005050/en/Worldwide-Wearable
-Computing-Market-Gains-Momentum-Shipments [hereinafter Worldwide
Wearable Computing Market] (predicting that activity trackers will lead the
wearable tech market through 2018).
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wearer, forged by a kinship very similar to that attachment
most individuals feel to their engagement rings or to their cell
phones. These trackers become the silent, ever-present witness
to the lives of their wearers. The data contained on these devices can therefore be indescribably helpful in police investigations in which there are no objective impartial witnesses. In
June of 2015, the data contained in a Fitbit device helped law
enforcement officers determine that a purported rape victim
had not been sleeping in her bed at the time of the alleged rape
as she had claimed, but was in fact walking around her apart17
ment. The Fitbit data was used not only to discredit her claim,
but also as evidence to support the woman’s eventual prosecution. Activity trackers are increasingly prevalent, and contain a
large quantity of intimately personal data that carries huge potential to aid in law enforcement investigations. However,
courts and scholars have yet to consider whether a suspect’s activity tracker may be searched without a warrant incident to
the suspect’s arrest.
To confront this issue, courts must determine the lasting
power of a leading Supreme Court case that has long governed
container searches in the wake of a recent case establishing an
exception of indeterminate breadth. In United States v. Robinson, the Court ruled that a container found on Robinson’s person during an arrest—a crumpled package of cigarettes—could
18
be searched without a warrant at the time of his arrest. However, the Court recently held in Riley v. California that Robin19
son does not apply to cell phones. Officers are therefore required to obtain a search warrant before conducting a search of
16. See, e.g., Sara M. Watson, Stepping Down: Rethinking the Fitness
Tracker, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2014/09/hacking-the-fitness-tracker-to-move-less-not-more/380742
(claiming that the author’s Fitbit was an “extension of [her] awareness of distance, of quantified movement through space”).
17. Mariella Moon, Fitbit Tracking Data Comes Up in Another Court Case,
ENGADGET (June 28, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/06/28/fitbit-data
-used-by-police (“The woman told the police she woke up around midnight with
the stranger on top of her, and that she lost her tracker while struggling
against her assailant. However, authorities found her Fitbit, which recorded
her as active, awake and walking around all night.”); see also Lynnsey Gardner, Fitness Tracker Data Used in Court Cases, NEWS4JAX (Feb. 22, 2016,
11:29 PM) http://www.news4jax.com/news/investigations/fitness-tracker-data
-now-used-as-evidence-in-court-cases (“Police believe the steps recorded on her
device prove Nina was awake and staging the crime scene instead of being
asleep and ripped out of bed like she claimed.”).
18. 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
19. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
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a cell phone at the time of the suspect’s arrest. The Riley
Court relied on the storage capacity and ubiquity of modern cell
21
phones, but much of its analysis is arguably applicable to all
22
digital data, whether or not it is found on a cell phone. Courts
have just begun to flesh out the contours of the Riley exception,
and must determine how to apply Riley to other digital containers, including increasingly popular smart activity trackers.
Smart activity trackers are just one type of digital device that
courts will have to face. In the not-so-distant future, it is probable that numerous types of personal data will be collected and
stored on devices individuals use and carry with us at all times.
For this reason, it is crucial that courts apply Riley consistently
to the myriad of smart devices on the market.
This Note argues that courts should interpret Riley as proscribing unwarranted searches of all digital data on smart devices found on the persons of arrestees, including smart activity
trackers. Part I describes the Court’s treatment of arrest
searches and searches of digital data, the Court’s protection
against certain types of unwarranted searches, and the increasing popularity and capacity of smart activity trackers. Part II
analyzes the position of smart activity trackers in relation to
other wearable smart technology previously governed by Robinson and recently contemplated by Riley, and discusses the
need for practical and workable law enforcement rules. Part III
concludes that courts should interpret Riley as endorsing a twotiered approach that carefully distinguishes warrantless
searches of physical items from searches of the digital data
they contain, allowing the former but prohibiting the latter. Ultimately, this Note argues that law enforcement officers should
be allowed to physically search smart devices without a warrant, but should be required to obtain warrants to search digital data on smart activity trackers, and encourages further officer education regarding the types of devices available.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE HAS BEEN
INCREASINGLY PROTECTIVE AGAINST HIGH-TECH
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION
Though Fourth Amendment protections have advanced in
recent years, it is not yet clear how smart activity trackers—or
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2489–91.
22. See, e.g., id. at 2485 (“No [security-based] unknowns exist with respect
to digital data.”).
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other smart devices—will be treated by officers conducting
searches incident to arrest. This Part first describes the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and introduces broad constitutional search requirements, and then provides a primer on existing case law that serves as the legal backdrop for law enenforcement searches of smart data. Finally, this Part explores
the growing smart activity tracker trend in greater depth,
demonstrating the criminal justice system’s need for a definitive placement of smart activity trackers within the Fourth
Amendment framework.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIONS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment guarantees Americans the right
“to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
23
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Founders
wrote and adopted the Fourth Amendment specifically to protect against excessively probing searches by the government,
policing the boundary between necessary government intrusion
24
and personal privacy. The Founders specifically aimed to protect not only physical objects, but private information as well,
25
and therefore included a specific protection of “papers.” The
Court has further emphasized the focus on protecting intangible aspects of its citizens’ lives from government intrusion by
finding that the government seizes property by meaningfully
interfering with an individual’s possessory property interests
and that it conducts a search when it infringes upon expecta26
tions of privacy that society considers reasonable.
The Supreme Court has often analyzed Fourth Amendment requirements and has laid out guidelines for lower courts
and law enforcement agencies regarding its parameters. The
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment also states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” Id.
24. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 980–84 (describing the use of suspicionless
searches in the era just before the revolutionary war and the backlash in the
American colonies influencing the Framers).
25. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
11, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-132) (noting that the Framers “used written
communications, both public and private, to revolutionize political life on the
American continent, so they promptly provided for protection of information
against government seizure and search after the founding”).
26. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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Court has generally required officers to obtain search warrants
prior to searching, so inferences supporting the search will be
assessed by a neutral judge and not only by the potentially bi27
ased officer. However, if the search falls under one of the war28
rant requirement’s many established exceptions, no warrant
29
is necessary. Exceptions to the warrant requirement are established by balancing the degree of intrusion on the defendant’s privacy with the degree to which the exception is needed
30
to promote government interests.
One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent
circumstances requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to perform warrantless searches in emergency circumstances: “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
31
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Another
exception allows officers to conduct searches incident to lawful
32
arrests—searching both the arrestee’s person and the area
33
within the arrestee’s control. Though the exact scope of the legally searchable area has changed over time, the Court has
never cast doubt on the premise that at a minimum the ar34
restee’s person may be searched. Two discrete justifications
35
support the search incident to a lawful arrest exception. First,
courts have long held that officers may search for and seize
36
weapons to maintain their own safety. Second, courts allow
27. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
28. See, e.g., Benjamin T. Clark, Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirement Should Be Extended to Sporting
Events, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 707, 715 (2006) (listing many exceptions, including
consent, stop and frisk, airports, courthouses, hot pursuit, borders, searches
incident to arrest, and drug testing of high school athletes).
29. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
30. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (discussing the
balancing required for exceptions to the warrant requirement).
31. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
32. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (noting that the government’s right “to search the person of the accused when legally arrested . . .
has been uniformly maintained in many cases”).
33. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
34. See id. at 225–26 (citing a string of authorities supporting the proposition).
35. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (detailing the
justifications for exceptions).
36. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 231 (“A due regard for [the officer’s and the
public’s] safety . . . justif[ies] a sufficient search to ascertain if such weapons
were carried about the person . . . and . . . to seize and hold them.” (quoting
Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482 (1867))).
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officers to seize evidence of the crime to ensure its preserva37
tion. Chimel v. California laid down the first limitations on
searches incident to arrest, holding a warrantless search of an
entire home is unreasonable, but searching areas in the imme38
diate control of an arrestee is reasonable, a holding later ex39
tended to searches of the persons of arrestees.
B. THE COURT’S TREATMENT OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
PRIOR TO RILEY
In United States v. Robinson and its progeny, the Court
40
applied Chimel’s rationale to the context of police pat downs.
This Section describes the decisions that led to the warrant requirements as they existed at the time the Court considered Riley. This Section then describes the Court’s protective treatment of advanced technology in the search context.
1. United States v. Robinson Enables Constitutional
Container Searches
The Robinson Court applied Chimel to the search of a con41
tainer found on an arrestee’s person. An officer pulled over
Robinson on suspicion of driving without a license, informed
him he was under arrest, and upon patting him down, “felt an
object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat [Robinson] was
42
wearing.” The officer reached into the pocket and pulled out
an object that appeared to be a “crumpled up cigarette pack43
age.” Feeling objects inside the package, the officer opened it,
44
finding fourteen capsules filled with heroin.
Robinson holds that neither the search nor seizure of the
45
items violated the Fourth Amendment. Though the opinion
notes that the arresting officer could not tell what the object
37. See id. at 230 (“[C]ustody is of no value if the law is powerless to prevent the abstraction or destruction of this evidence, without which a trial
would be no more than an empty form.” (citing Dillon v. O’Brien [1887] 16 Cox
Crim. Cas. 245 (Exch. Div.) (Ir.))).
38. 395 U.S. at 762–63.
39. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
40. See id.
41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). In fact, Robinson was
the only case to apply Chimel to the search incident to lawful arrest until Riley. Id.; see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 257–59 (applying Chimel).
42. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220–23.
43. Id. at 223.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 224.
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was, and once he held the package in his hand, could not tell
46
what was inside, the opinion notably does not address the
search of the cigarette package as separate from the search of
47
Robinson’s person. Instead Robinson simply states that, having found the package during a lawful search, the officer was
48
entitled to search it. The dissent points out that the search of
the package did not further the protective purposes for which
the search began, as the cigarette package was out of the hands
of the arrestee, and therefore suggested “the mere fact of an arrest should be no justification, in and of itself, for invading the
49
privacy of the individual’s personal effects.”
In Robinson, the justification for allowing warrantless
searches incident to arrest “rests quite as much on the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does
on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at
50
trial.” Therefore, standards should not be stricter if it is unlikely that evidence of the crime will be found on the arrestee’s
person or there is no greater probability of weaponry being
51
found on the person of the arrestee. Robinson favors a categorical rule because law enforcement officer decisions as to how to
search arrestees are “necessarily . . . ad hoc judgment[s]” and,
regardless of the crime in question, arrests expose officers to
similar levels of danger, so the Court opted to “treat[] all custo52
dial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.”
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Robinson spells out several
concerning outcomes that could flow from Robinson’s holding,
including the potential for officer searches of wallets and sealed
envelopes found on the person of an arrestee on the basis that
53
they might contain razor blades or pins. The Court addressed
several of these concerns in later cases by narrowing Robinson’s scope. It first addressed exactly what may be searched at
46. Id. at 223.
47. See id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (breaking the search into
three discrete stages).
48. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); Robinson, 414
U.S. at 236; see also id. at 255–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . .
fails to recognize that the search . . . included a separate search of effects
found on [the defendant’s] person. . . . [T]here was no justification . . . which
would authorize [the officer] opening the package and looking inside.”).
49. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 256–57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 234 (majority opinion).
51. Id. at 234–35.
52. Id. at 235.
53. Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the time of arrest without a search warrant, recognizing a more
distinct line between the search of an individual’s person and
his effects. In United States v. Chadwick, officers searched luggage that was seized at the time and place of the defendant’s
arrest, but was not searched until several hours later, when it
54
was no longer in the control of the arrestee. Chadwick limits
the Robinson warrant exception to “personal property . . . im55
mediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” Knowles
v. Iowa further narrows Robinson’s scope, holding the doctrine
inapplicable to law enforcement interactions involving only the
56
issuance of citations. Knowles reasons that both Chimel justifications are weaker when an officer issues a citation than
when she arrests a suspect—in citation issuances, officer safety
is not implicated to the same degree and there is no inculpatory
57
evidence to destroy. However, due to unique circumstances in
the vehicle context, Arizona v. Gant concludes that upon arrest,
officers may only warrantlessly search the vehicle of the arrestee if “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance” of the searched areas or if the officer reasonably thinks
58
that the vehicle holds evidence relevant to the crime.
2. The Court’s Increased Protections Against High-Tech
Searches
In recent years, the Court has extended Fourth Amendment protection to cover high-tech government searches. This
Subsection addresses areas of particular concern for the Court.
First, this Subsection addresses the Court’s protection of activities in the home from prying government eyes and its desire to
protect GPS data. This Subsection goes on to discuss the
Court’s unwillingness to protect items that have been shared
with third parties.
a. Protection of Information Concerning the Confines of the
Home
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered whether a
search subject to Fourth Amendment protections occurred
54. 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
55. Id. at 15.
56. 525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998).
57. Id. at 116, 118–19.
58. 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (noting that the exception was not implicated
by Chimel but is needed due to unique circumstances present in automobile
searches).
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when police officers viewed the outside of a home with a thermal imaging device to confirm the locations of high intensity
59
lamps that facilitate indoor marijuana growth. Kyllo distinguishes the use of thermal imaging technology from ordinary
visual surveillance, noting that officers gained “information regarding the interior of the home,” which ordinarily would re60
quire physical intrusion. Despite the crude system used in the
case itself, Kyllo indicates a desire to safeguard against advanced systems, instead of “leav[ing] the homeowner at the
61
mercy of advancing technology.”
Kyllo places particular emphasis on protecting the privacy
of citizens, indicating that protection should depend not on the
level of technology employed but on whether it enabled officer
62
observation of intimate activity. However, Kyllo rejects the
government’s suggestion that only “intimate” details need to be
protected, saying that officers could not “know in advance
whether . . . surveillance picks up ‘intimate’ details” and therefore could not determine on the spot whether surveillance
63
would be constitutional. In the home, “all details are intimate
64
details” to be kept “safe from prying government eyes.”
Kyllo demonstrates the Court’s willingness to consider law
enforcement use of technology to reconstruct activities within
the home as a search requiring a warrant, even where the offic65
ers did not physically enter the home. Though Kyllo focuses on
intimate details, it goes further than finding a search occurred
only where private information is actually discovered. It instead concludes that where officers use a device not in public
use to gather “details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a war66
rant.”
59. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
60. Id. at 32, 34. The Court found it to be a search where the technology is
not in general public use. Id. at 40.
61. Id. at 35, 36 (“While the technology [here] was relatively crude, the
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” (footnote omitted)).
62. Id. at 38 (noting that even low-tech systems could determine “at what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna” while a more sensitive system would be able to pick up the less intimate details such as whether or not a closet light was left on).
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id. at 37.
65. See id. at 41–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 39–40 (majority opinion). The Court found discerning activity
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b. Court Consideration of Searches Yielding Locational Data
In United States v. Jones, the Court again demonstrated its
concern for citizen privacy when determining that the warrantless placement of a GPS device on a person’s vehicle was a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment as “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
67
obtaining information.” The Court had twice before held that
gathering data from location tracking devices did not violate
68
the Fourth Amendment, but Jones holds that placing a GPS
tracker on a vehicle is a search because it is a physical tres69
pass.
Some courts also note the unique quantity and quality of
GPS data. First, this type of data produces vast stores of infor70
mation but requires the use of very few resources by officers,
who can therefore gain a great deal of personal information
about a suspect with very little effort or expense. Additionally,
courts note that this data can be very personal:
Disclosed in the data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature
of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist,
the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center,
the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel,
the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and
on and on. What the technology yields and records with breathtaking
quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where
we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious,
amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our
71
professional and avocational pursuits.

Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence indicated that the
government keeps this data forever and can “ascertain, more or
less at will . . . political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and

within the home requires a warrant, even with no physical intrusion into the
home. See id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
68. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–19 (1984) (holding a procedure similar to United States v. Knotts did not constitute a violation because
the owner consented to the transmitter’s insertion); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (holding the placement of a radio transmitter in a
package the defendant later received was not a Fourth Amendment violation).
69. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
70. See id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (indicating it “would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance”).
71. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009); see Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at
1199).
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so on,” and suggested this may have an undesirable chilling ef72
fect on personal freedoms.
c. Items Shared with Third Parties Typically Receive No
Fourth Amendment Protection
Though it has not directly addressed the issue in the context of advanced technology, the Court held in California v.
Greenwood that citizens have no reasonable expectation of pri73
vacy in items shared with third parties. The Court found that
a search of trash did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protec74
tion.” Greenwood holds that even when not given to a third
party, “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
75
public.” Jones therefore determined that “what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
76
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” In her
Jones concurrence, however, Justice Sotomayor suggests that
the third party information standard should be readdressed in
77
light of the digital age.
C. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
The Court further expanded its protection of high-tech data
in Riley, which lower courts are just beginning to apply. In Riley v. California and its companion case, United States v.
Wurie, the Court considered whether law enforcement officers
may search a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person without
78
a warrant. During a pat down following Riley’s arrest for firearm possession, the officer found items indicating gang affiliation and a cell phone that had many features “based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and
79
Internet connectivity.” The officer proceeded to access information on the phone, finding further indicia of gang involve72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988).
Id. at 40.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
Id.

2016]

SMART ACTIVITY TRACKERS

1701

80

ment. A gang crimes detective found videos of men fighting
and yelling a gang name, and photos of Riley with a car police
81
believed to be involved in a recent shooting. Riley was charged
with offenses related to the past shooting with an aggravating
factor of benefiting a street gang, and was convicted on all
82
counts.
Riley holds that “Robinson’s categorical rule . . . [is] appropriate . . . in the context of physical objects,” but further holds
that Robinson’s justifications do not apply to digital data found
83
on cell phones. Riley detects little risk of potential harm to arresting officers, but nonetheless holds that an officer’s inspec84
tion of the physical contours of the device is permissible. Such
a search would enable an officer to determine that the object is
a cell phone rather than a bomb, and that there are no razor
blades between the case and the phone, without violating the
Constitution. The other justification—the avoidance of destruction of evidence—does not apply, as once the phone has been
seized, the arrestee cannot destroy the phone or data within
85
it. According to the Court, the potential to avoid passcode encryption does not justify warrantless police searches of cell
phones across the board. Police officers very seldom come
across unlocked cell phones, and even when they do, they generally cannot conduct full searches before a data wipe occurs or
86
the phone locks itself. The Court states that to avoid as much
loss of evidence as possible, officers may constitutionally disable the phone’s automatic-lock feature to prevent loss of data
87
access. Finally, the Court states that privacy interests at

80. Id. (indicating that the arresting officer noticed some of the contacts
on the phone were preceded by letters indicating gang affiliation, corresponding to other items found on Riley’s person).
81. Id. at 2480–81.
82. Id. at 2481 (indicating that gang association can carry an enhanced
sentence).
83. Id. at 2484.
84. Id. at 2485. The government argued that searching cell phone data
protects officers by alerting them of confederates in the area, but the Court
found this concern was not valid and that this would broaden Chimel’s original
justification which applied to the ability of the arrestee to use the object as a
weapon to resist arrest or escape. Id. at 2485–86.
85. Id. at 2486. The Court dismissed concerns of remote data wiping, indicating officers could turn off phones or place them in Faraday bags, isolating
them from radio waves. Id. at 2487.
86. Id. at 2487.
87. Id. at 2487–88 (comparing this to securing a crime scene while awaiting a warrant).
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stake in a cell phone search differ from those in a physical
search, implicating Chimel’s holding that searching arrestee’s
home was an impermissible intrusion on the arrestee’s priva88
cy. Riley determines that arrestees’ decreased privacy interest
is increased in the context of cell phones compared to searches
89
of physical items. Riley therefore limits Robinson’s application
and adds a layer to the Robinson analysis by stating that different considerations must be taken into account as to whether
a cell phone found on the arrestee’s person may be searched.
Robinson’s cigarette packet was not likely to contain any
evidence that he was driving without a license, nor was it likely
to contain anything with which Robinson might have injured
the arresting officer, but Robinson holds the search constitu90
tional. Conversely, Riley determines that a search of a cell
phone which similarly would not have injured the officers nor
contain any evidence of the crime for which Riley was arrested
was not constitutional. To justify its ruling, the Riley Court
waxes poetic about the uniqueness of modern cell phones by describing their features and capabilities, comparing them to
physical items, and touting their immense storage capacity.
The Court describes cell phones as hybrids that contain cameras, calendars, diaries, maps, and newspapers, stating:
Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received
for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every
book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so. . . .
. . . Cell phones couple that capacity with the ability to store many
different types of information: Even the most basic phones that sell
for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text
messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry
91
phone book, and so on.

The Court also notes four unique features of cell phones
that make their unwarranted search more likely to constitute a
great intrusion on the privacy of the arrested individual. First,
cell phones contain many types of information that reveal more

88. Id.
89. Id. at 2484–85.
90. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (indicating that the Court has not
overlooked this point, but rather than requiring a case-by-case adjudication,
asks instead if the application to “this particular category of effects would ‘untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception’” (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332, 343 (2009))).
91. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.

2016]

SMART ACTIVITY TRACKERS

1703

92

in the aggregate than they do individually. Second, the vast
capacity of cell phones allows the possessor to store a wealth of
93
data of any individual type. Third, the span of time the data
encompasses is far greater than the data an individual would
94
naturally carry on his person. Fourth, the Court notes that
most people carry cell phones, and therefore a rule allowing
warrantless cell phone searches might have a broader reach
95
than Robinson intended.
Riley notes the uniqueness of the type of data cell phones
contain, suggesting the Robinson Court could never have imagined the type of personal data that can now be recovered from
cell phones, indicating that “certain types of data are also qual96
itatively different.” Riley explains that web browsing history
found on cell phones “could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of dis97
ease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.” The Court also
describes concerns regarding location information, suggesting
that access to this data would allow police to “reconstruct
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
98
around town but also within a particular building.” The Court
goes on to explain that “[t]he average smart phone user has installed 33 app[lication]s, which together can form a revealing
99
montage of the user’s life.” The Court apparently does not find
browsing history or such intensive personal data to be dispositive, however. Companion plaintiff Wurie’s cell phone was a
92. Id. (noting the possibilities of addresses, notes, prescriptions, bank
statements, and videos).
93. Id. (explaining the practical difference between a single photo “tucked
into a wallet” and “a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions”).
94. Id. (comparing a slip of paper in a man’s pocket reminding him to call
a friend to a record of all communications with that friend over the past several months).
95. Id. at 2490 (“Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or
two in the occasional case.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party
news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer
requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your
budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your
romantic life. There are popular apps for buying or selling just about anything,
and the records of such transactions may be accessible on the phone indefinitely.”).
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non-smart phone, a phone type which the Court notes “generally has a smaller range of features than a smart phone” that
100
may not include internet access or a wide array of apps. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the search of such a phone requires a warrant.
The Court also touches on special issues presented by cloud
computing, stating that searches of data in the cloud are unconstitutional, but officers—and the owner of the phone—may
not know whether a file is stored on the cloud or on the phone,
101
causing further difficulties in searching cell phones.
Riley holds that officers must secure warrants before
102
searching cell phones. It explicitly rejects less practical options, refusing to extend Gant to cell phones by restricting access to areas of the phone whose non-digital counterparts were
103
Riley notes how quickly warrants can be obsearchable.
104
tained and points out that the exigent circumstances exception can be used in instances when the particular situation is so
105
dire as to make a warrantless search reasonable.
D. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF RILEY
In the months following Riley, lower courts have disagreed
on the appropriate standard for searches of digital data and
how Riley should be applied to other smart devices. Interpretations of Riley’s application to cell phone searches seem to follow
directly from the ruling. For example, one court held that looking at the serial number of the phone is likely a “physical attribute” of the phone itself, not a piece of data, and therefore
not considered a search of digital data entitled to Riley protec106
tions. Another court found that looking at the screen saver of
107
a phone is acceptable under the plain view doctrine.
100. See id. at 2481.
101. “Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.” Id. at
2491.
102. Id. at 2485.
103. Id. at 2493.
104. Id. (citing to the example of a jurisdiction where police officers use
iPads to e-mail warrant requests to judges and receive valid warrants in under
fifteen minutes).
105. Id. at 2494 (listing evidence destruction and pursuit of fleeing suspects as exigencies).
106. United States v. Lowe, No. 2:14-cr-00004-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 5106053
(D. Nev. Oct. 1, 2014).
107. Sinclair v. State, 118 A.3d 872, 888 (Md. 2015).
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However, when applying Riley to other smart devices,
courts have varied in their interpretations. Some courts hold
that Riley protects all digital data, on the basis that “Riley held
unequivocally that digital data is not subject to the warrant exception for searches incident to arrest and . . . officers must obtain a warrant before searching the contents of an arrestee’s
108
electronic devices,” and indicate that under Riley, citizens
now have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of
109
their electronic devices.”
Other courts, however, have eagerly limited Riley’s application outside the specific context of cell phones. Courts have
found that Riley does not prevent searches of credit cards or
searches of digital cameras, but even courts agreeing on the result do not agree on the method to determine whether such a
search is legal. At least two courts have found that searches of
the magnetic stripes on the back of credit and gift cards are not
110
protected under Riley. The standards applied by each court to
determine the permissibility of these searches were different.
One court explained that the “quality and quantity of personal
information” on a magnetic stripe was not comparable to that of
111
a smartphone. The other court stated that the amount of data
included in the stripe “would not allow officers to reconstruct
112
an individual’s private life.”
Other courts have addressed the question of Riley’s application to digital cameras. Some courts have found that the digital data found on cameras is not protected from a warrantless
113
search incident to arrest. Once again, there appears to be an
inconsistency across the courts when it comes to the standard
for determining that Riley does not protect data on digital cameras. One court found that the camera in question was not protected because it did not have the capabilities of a smartphone,
nor were the photos labeled in such a manner that an individu114
al’s life could be reconstructed. Another court stated that dig108. United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 817 (D. Md. 2015).
109. State v. Purtell, 851 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Wis. 2014).
110. See United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Benjamin, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349, at *4 (D. Neb. Oct.
24, 2014).
111. See Benjamin, 2014 WL 5431349, at *3.
112. See Bah, 794 F.3d at 633.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d 695, 701 (E.D. Mich.
2014); People v. Raoult, 2d Crim. No. B256148, 2015 WL 3874302, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 23, 2015).
114. See Raoult, 2015 WL 3874302, at *3.
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ital cameras are not used on a continuous basis like cell phones
are, and that “cameras contain a limited type of data, restricted
to image and video files, that do not touch the breadth or depth
115
of information that a cell phone’s data offers.”
Scholarly commentary indicates that it is not entirely clear
how Riley should be applied to other devices. The Court’s decision to consider Riley and Wurie together despite the very different phones underlying the two cases may imply that it would
be “reasonable for a court to assume that the ability to make
and receive phone calls is dispositive, given the Court’s group116
ing together of the general category of cell phones.” The
Court’s joint consideration of Wurie and Riley might also indicate that any device that implicates more privacy concerns
than a non-smart cell phone should not be searched without a
117
warrant. Alternatively, Riley might encourage a “contextual
approach” in which a court “looks to social norms to determine
whether a particular disclosure is ‘expected’ under the circum118
stances.”
Court readings of Riley are clearly inconsistent and will only breed confusion as courts are forced to apply Riley to new
and varying smart devices. Courts need a singular standard by
which to assess the warrant requirements for all smart devices,
lest citizens’ privacy be better protected when their pictures are
on their phones than on their cameras.
E. THE INCREASING UBIQUITY AND CAPACITY OF SMART
ACTIVITY TRACKERS
Technology has advanced since Robinson’s container
119
search rule, and continues to evolve rapidly. As Riley noted,
some technological devices are a “pervasive and insistent part
120
of daily life.” This is quickly becoming true of smart activity
115. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 700.
116. Kelly Ozurovich, Comment, Riley v. California—Cell Phones and
Technology in the Twenty-First Century, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507, 521 (2014).
117. Id.
118. Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth
Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L.
REV. 1140, 1143 (2015).
119. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (noting that ten
years previously, smart phones would have been “unheard of,” and that even
flip phones like Wurie’s have existed for less than fifteen years).
120. Id. (suggesting cellphones in particular are so commonplace that “the
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of
human anatomy”).
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trackers, which are worn on the body and allow wearers to tog121
gle through their statistics at the touch of a button. Of all
these companies, Fitbit has been particularly successful. It had
sold 20.8 million units as of March 2015, and its users include
not only your friends and family, but also President Obama and
122
Britney Spears. Additionally, in an analysis of popular mobile
applications (apps), Fitbit’s app, through which the user can
track weight, water, and food intake to supplement the data
123
gathered by the associated device, is the second most popular
124
app associated with a connected device on the Apple and
125
Google Play stores.
The data these devices contain varies by device and, unsurprisingly, the capacity of these devices has become more advanced as time progresses. For illustrative purposes, one can
look to the historical development of the devices produced by
126
Fitbit, the most popular smart activity tracker creator. The
original Fitbit, often dubbed “Fitbit classic,” was first produced

121. See Nathan Chandler, How Fitbit Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://
electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/other-gadgets/fitbit.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016) (describing Fitbit’s OLED screen, which scrolls through the user’s current fitness statistics); Rachael Rettner, Tracker Craze: Fitness Wristbands’ Popularity Will Continue To Grow, FOX NEWS (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/01/02/tracker-craze-fitness-wristbands
-popularity-will-continue-to-grow (“Fitness trackers . . . are rapidly increasing
in popularity, and experts say this trend will continue in the coming years.”).
122. See Ananya Bhattacharya, Fitbit Is Now Worth $4.1 Billion After IPO,
CNNMONEY (June 25, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/17/
investing/fitbit-ipo.
123. Though activity tracker devices are frequently linked to apps with
which nutritional and weight information are logged, such information is
saved on the website itself, not within the wearable device, and is therefore
not among the data with which this Note is concerned.
124. Popularity of the Fitbit app is a rough proxy for popularity of the
Fitbit devices. Apps connected to outside devices are apps designed (sometimes solely) to gather information from a separate device from the phone itself. The Fitbit app displays the user’s daily step tally, calorie burn, active
minutes, and sleep quality. This information can only be displayed if the user
actually uses a Fitbit device and connects it to the account.
125. See Aditi Pai, Only Google Chromecast’s App Is More Popular than
Fitbit’s in Connected Device Category, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://mobihealthnews.com/37214/only-google-chromecasts-app-is-more
-popular-than-fitbits-in-connected-device-category (noting that other apps
connect to television streaming services, printers, or credit card readers).
126. See Robert Hof, How Fitbit Survived as a Hardware Startup, FORBES
(Feb. 4, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/02/04/how
-fitbit-survived-as-a-hardware-startup (noting that “Fitbit has 77% of the
market for full-body activity trackers”).
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127

in 2009 and tracked steps, distance, activity intensity, and
128
sleep. Fitbit next produced the Fitbit Ultra in 2011, adding
an accelerometer that tracked the wearer’s elevation, then subsequent models, including the One, Zip, and Flex, which sync
wirelessly to cell phones using Bluetooth technology and con129
tain some permutation of the aforementioned features. Newer
130
devices contain heart rate and GPS data. Both existing and
potential users have concerns about the privacy implications of
131
tracking this information, and even some elected officials
have noted the importance of keeping this “highly personal in132
formation” safe.
On the other hand, this data has the potential to be very
useful to law enforcement and the judiciary due to its objective
and mechanical nature. At least two lawsuits are pending at
the time of this writing that rely heavily on Fitbit data. First,
in a personal injury suit, data will be used to establish that the
plaintiff’s quality of life has decreased since an accident due to
133
reduced physical activity. Second, in a criminal prosecution,
law enforcement relied on the Fitbit data of a purported rape
134
victim to prosecute her for a false rape report. While the
127. Id. (noting that Fitbit classics went up for order in December 2009).
128. See Robert J. Nelson, Everything You Need To Know About Fitbit,
IMORE (June 12, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.imore.com/everything-you-need
-know-about-fitbit.
129. See id.
130. Charge HR, supra note 11; Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (explaining
that data can be uploaded “[w]ith a simple connection to your computer”).
131. See Laura Schooler, Wearable Technology Future Is Ripe for Growth—
Most Notably Among Millennials, Says PwC US, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
LLP (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/wearable
-technology-future.html (describing a survey in which “82 percent of respondents were worried that wearable technology would invade their privacy and 86
percent expressed concern that wearables would make them more vulnerable
to security breaches”).
132. See Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, Senator, N.Y., Fitbit Bracelets
and Smartphone Apps Are Tracking Users’ Movements and Health Data that
Could Be Sold to Third Parties (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.schumer.senate
.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-reveals-without-their-knowledge-fitbit
-bracelets-and-smartphone-apps-are-tracking-users-movements-and-health
-data-that-could-be-sold-to-third-parties-calls-for-ftc-to-require-mandatory
-opt-out-opportunity-before-any-personal-data-can-be-sold.
133. See Moon, supra note 17; Nina Zipkin, Move Over DNA, Your Wearable Data Could Soon Be Used in the Courtroom, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 17,
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/239869 (hailing this Canadian
case as “the first case of its kind” which could set precedent for future claims).
134. See Myles Snyder, Police: Woman’s Fitness Watch Disproved Rape Report, ABC27NEWS (June 19, 2015), http://abc27.com/2015/06/19/police
-womans-fitness-watch-disproved-rape-report.
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woman had claimed she was sleeping when “an unknown man
pulled her out of bed, attacked her in a bathroom, and raped
135
her at knifepoint,” her Fitbit Surge indicated she had been
136
awake and walking around throughout the night. Ultimately,
this woman was charged with “false reports to law enforcement, false alarms to public safety, and tampering with evi137
dence” for creating a scene of a struggle. Parties to litigation
are already realizing the potential of this data to aid in checking credibility and even to support prosecutions.
It is crucial at this juncture to recognize that smart activity
trackers are not the only devices that have the potential to capture more personal data than ever before. Activity trackers are
just one manifestation of the recent expansion of the “Internet
of Things.” This theory describes a not-so-distant future in
which “nearly everything that can be connected to the Internet
138
will be.” In the “Internet of Things,” “[e]verything from televisions to refrigerators to electricity meters will be capable of re139
cording data.” Other unique notable examples of the “Inter140
141
net of Things” include Google Glass, the Apple Watch, and
Filip, which is marketed to parents for use by their young children and hosts a limited array of features that nonetheless con142
tain intimate personal information. Developers will inevitably continue to develop advanced technologies for devices that
135. Id.
136. See Stephanie M. Lee, As Companies Collect More Health Data, Cops
Will Ask To See It, BUZZFEED (Nov. 5, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.buzzfeed
.com/stephaniemlee/law-enforcement-requests-for-users-health-and-biometric
-data (indicating that the Fitbit model was a Surge).
137. Snyder, supra note 134.
138. Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should
Apply United States v. Jones To Protect People’s Data, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
377, 392 (2015).
139. Id.
140. See Anisha Mehta, Comment, “Bring Your Own Glass:” The Privacy
Implications of Google Glass in the Workplace, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH.
& PRIVACY L. 607, 609 (2014) (describing Google Glass’s “ability to continuously record and transmit data within the wearer’s surroundings”).
141. See Apple Unveils Apple Watch—Apple’s Most Personal Device Ever,
APPLE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/09Apple
-Unveils-Apple-Watch-Apples-Most-Personal-Device-Ever.html
(describing
Apple’s “most personal device ever,” which allows the wearer to transmit their
“heartbeat” to another user).
142. See Stay Connected on Any Adventure: Next Generation Wearable
Phone & Locator for Kids, FILIP, http://www.myfilip.com/about-filip (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing a device that looks like a watch, but contains a
GPS tracker and allows the wearer to call five numbers and receive—but not
send—text messages).
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can be worn on one’s person that will contain an increasing
quantity of data of an increasingly personal nature. With Robinson still guiding the search of physical items, and Riley purporting to apply only to cell phones, courts must develop a
standard as to how devices between these two extremes should
be handled.
II. EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
INDICATES THAT DIGITAL DATA ON ACTIVITY
TRACKERS SHOULD BE PROTECTED
The standards lower courts have used when applying Riley
to magnetic stripes of credit cards and digital cameras indicate
a need for a clear and consistent interpretation of Riley’s applicability to smart devices that are not cell phones. Riley cast
additional Fourth Amendment protection over cell phones,
holding that an unwarranted search of a cell phone was an unreasonable search. To determine whether an unwarranted
search of a smart activity tracker should likewise be considered
unreasonable, this Part compares cell phones and activity
trackers. It determines that activity trackers contain less data
than cell phones, but that the digital data activity trackers hold
is extremely personal, and therefore this data merits special
treatment from the Robinson rule. This Part goes on to discuss
the law enforcement need for easily workable and practical
rules, the Court’s deference to this need, and when the Court
has been willing to make exceptions to bright-line rules in the
past.
A. CELL PHONES AND ACTIVITY TRACKERS ARE SIMILAR BUT
NOT IDENTICAL
Because Riley’s outcome is justified by the “pervasiveness
of cell phones and their capacity to retain and transport the
143
privacies of life,” it is important to compare the two types of
devices. This Section compares cell phones and activity trackers, looking at the way that these devices are carried, their
physical capacity to hide weapons, and their societal prevalence. The Section then compares the type and quantity of data
that is held by each type of device, as well as methods through
which the data is stored.

143. Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky & Privacy Concerns on the Ground,
11 SCITECH LAW., no. 4, 2015, at 6, 9.
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1. Comparing the Place of Cell Phones and Activity Trackers
in Society and on Our Bodies
Before exploring the data held by each type of device, it is
important to compare the physical nature of the devices themselves, as well as their respective places in society. Activity
trackers, like cell phones, are frequently carried continuously
on one’s person, and are therefore likely to be found during a
144
pat down. Activity trackers are perhaps more likely to be
found on the person, as they are designed to be worn on the
145
body as an armband or tucked inside of clothing. Activity
trackers do not record any personal data if they are not worn on
146
the person. Cell phones, on the other hand, while frequently
carried in the pocket, are not always kept there, and may be
found just as often in a purse or placed on an adjacent sur147
face. This means that activity trackers are even more likely
than cell phones to be found and inspected during searches incident to arrest or during frisks performed under reasonable
suspicion.
Activity trackers are fairly similar physically to cell phones
both in size and in their lack of capacity to harm officers. Both
cell phones and activity trackers tend to fit within the palm of
one’s hand, though activity trackers are smaller than cell
148
phones. Because the devices are fairly similar physically,
they likely hold the same low potential for danger to officers.
Despite the relative unlikelihood that a cell phone could conceal
a weapon with potential to injure an officer, under Riley officers
149
may search cell phones physically to seek out weapons. The
144. See Worldwide Wearable Computing Market, supra note 15 (referring
to fitness trackers as “wearables”).
145. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (“Flex fits comfortably around your wrist
. . . so you can wear it day to night.”); One, supra note 3 (“One clips securely
and discretely onto your pocket, belt or bra . . . .”).
146. See Nicole Radziszewski, Expert Answers: Is It Safe To Wear My Wireless Fitness Tracker All the Time?, EXPERIENCE LIFE (Nov. 2014), https://
experiencelife.com/article/expert-answers-is-it-safe-to-wear-my-wireless
-fitness-tracker-all-the-time (“[U]nlike cell phones, activity trackers are meant
to be worn on the body around the clock.”).
147. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“According to one
poll, nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet
of their phones most of the time . . . .”).
148. Compare One, supra note 3 (describing the Fitbit One as being 1.89
inches long, 0.76 inches wide, and 0.38 inches thick), with See all iPhone Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare (last visited Mar. 7, 2016)
(listing dimensions of four recent incarnations of the iPhone, which tend to be
around five to six inches long and two to three inches wide).
149. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“Law enforcement officers remain free to ex-

1712

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1689

need to take into account officer safety in light of the potential
for concealed weapons should be considered when structuring
150
police rules for handling activity trackers.
Finally, as noted extensively in Riley, cell phones are ubiq151
uitous in our society. The Court was quite concerned with the
implications of allowing warrantless searches of devices that
152
were so widely carried. At this point, activity trackers are becoming more common but have not reached the societal satura153
tion cell phones have achieved. This might indicate that activity trackers do not need the same protections as cell phones,
at least at this time. However, the Court tends to think forward
154
in the context of technology, and with the current level of
155
growth in the activity tracker market, providing greater protections than current numbers might require would be prudent
and forward thinking.
2. Activity Trackers Hold Less Data, but More Private
Information, than Cell Phones
The crux of whether or not Riley should be applied to require warrants to search smart activity trackers is whether the
data they contain is similarly private to that of cell phones and
thus merits Fourth Amendment protection. This Subsection
begins by explaining that while one of the most central features
of cell phones is their inherent ability to communicate with examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a
weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the
phone and its case.”).
150. The Court has in the past indicated a willingness to make exceptions
to the search incident to arrest exception where there is little to no likelihood
of weaponry or evidence of the crime to be found on the arrestee’s person. See
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 (1998). However, the Court’s willingness to
allow searches of cell phones for officer safety likely eliminates the possibility
of a Knowles-style exception here.
151. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (indicating that “more than 90% of American
adults . . . own a cell phone”).
152. Id. (stating that though police might have “occasionally” stumbled upon a diary in the past, cell phones would crop up far more frequently).
153. See Dorene Internicola, Activity Trackers Get Smarter at Measuring
Fitness, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/22/
us-fitness-trackers-idUSKBN0K00JJ20141222 (indicating that in the fall of
2013, one in ten American adults wore an activity tracker).
154. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[T]he technology
used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
155. See Rettner, supra note 121.
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ternal devices and individuals, activity trackers generally do
not have this ability. On the other hand, the purpose of activity
trackers, unlike that of cell phones, is to gather personal data
about their user and store it within the device. Finally, this
Subsection compares the storage capacity and methods of cell
phones and activity trackers and concludes that activity trackers hold far less data then cell phones, albeit data of an inherently private nature.
a. Cell Phones Are Designed for External Communication
In describing the capacity of the modern cell phone, Riley
focuses most on their capacity to communicate with other de156
vices and individuals. Most modern cell phones have the ca157
pacity to connect to the Internet. This ability to connect to the
Internet enables and encourages cell phone users to engage in
many private and intimate activities, such as banking, Internet
browsing, and the downloading and use of apps that yield addi158
tional information about the user. The Court’s interest in protecting this information from law enforcement seems counterintuitive when considering the fact that in purchasing apps,
calling or texting other cell phone users, or engaging in any
other Internet-based activity, the cell phone user has necessarily engaged in the sharing of data with third parties, which traditionally has left the user with no reasonable expectation of
159
privacy. This may influence the Court’s willingness to recon160
sider the third-party standard in light of the digital age.
However, Riley made no explicit statement that users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in any of these types of data.
In both Wurie and Riley, the information gained from the phone
had not been shared with anyone—Riley’s gang involvement
was inferred from photos on his phone, while Wurie’s phone
161
yielded a call to a number he labeled as “my house.” Some
156. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at passim (describing call logs, text messaging, email, voicemail, app downloads, and internet browsing history).
157. See id. (describing smartphone capacity to store internet browsing history and connect to the cloud).
158. See id. at 2490.
159. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that because the trash was left on the curb and intended to be handed over to a third
party, the owners had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it).
160. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[The third party disclosure] approach is ill suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
161. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
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scholars argue that the third-party exception should be curtailed or limited, as in the modern world “a once small and
manageable exception to the Fourth Amendment . . . now
threatens to swallow whole the privacy guaranteed by the
162
Fourth Amendment.”
Activity trackers, on the other hand, have a more limited
ability to connect and share data. These devices can typically
163
only connect to cell phones and computers, which then upload
164
the data to the tracker’s associated website or app. Activity
trackers are typically not capable of sharing data beyond this
limited capacity and cannot communicate from device to de165
vice. While there would potentially be a glimmer of an officer
safety concern in the context of use of a cell phone to communi166
cate with confederates, no such concern exists with activity
trackers.
b. Activity Trackers Gather Different and More Personal Data
than Cell Phones
While cell phones are designed to communicate with the
outside world, activity trackers are designed to collect data
about the way users live their lives, and then display it back to
167
the user. The type of data collected is intimate and private in
162. Turner, supra note 138, at 381; see also Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 262 (2015) (advocating for a restructuring of
the third party doctrine).
163. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (advertising Flex’s ability to “sync[] automatically and wirelessly to tablets, computers and . . . smartphones”).
164. This connection can be wireless. See, e.g., id. (indicating the Flex can
“[s]ync stats wirelessly [and] automatically to leading smartphones and computers”); Up3, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/fitness-tracker/up3 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016) (stating that Up3 “syncs wirelessly using Bluetooth®”). Alternatively, this connection can come through a physical connection. See Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (explaining that data can be uploaded “[w]ith a simple
connection to your computer”).
165. See, e.g., Fitbit App, FITBIT, https://fitbit.com/app (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) (indicating that to communicate stats with “friends and followers,” a
phone or computer is required); Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (noting that to
communicate with friends, data must be uploaded to a computer).
166. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (noting that the government entities made an
argument that searching cell phones might “alert[] officers that confederates
of the arrestee are headed to the scene” and concluding that though this is
“undoubtedly a strong government interest,” the government entities did not
adequately “suggest that their concerns [we]re based on actual experience”).
167. See, e.g., One, supra note 3 (describing the type of data captured and
indicating that the device is “discreet”); Specifications: Display, FITBIT, https://
www.fitbit.com/one#specs (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (noting that one simply
needs to “[p]ush the [display] button to cycle through daily stats” related to
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a different way than the data held on a cell phone, as these de168
vices track both personal GPS information and heart rate da169
ta. The Court has suggested that GPS data is inherently per170
sonal in the context of vehicles, and it is thus likely that
courts would find a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
171
non-regulated realm of personal travel. The privacy implications of knowing where an individual goes at which times of the
day become even more disturbing when the tracker is located
on one’s person, indicating travel once an individual exits her
vehicle, potentially revealing activity within the home, an area
172
strongly protected under Kyllo.
Courts have not yet determined the protective status of
heart rate data, but given the Court’s past holdings regarding
areas protected by the Fourth Amendment, it seems likely that
173
the Court would find this data to be private. Even more so
than GPS data, heart rate data has the potential to enable inferences that reveal deeply personal information, such as sleep
patterns, sexual activity, physical exertion, and general
174
health, especially when the data is available second by se-

exercise, sleep, and food eaten).
168. See Forerunner® 10, supra note 10.
169. See, e.g., Charge HR, supra note 11.
170. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
171. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“[R]educed expectations of privacy derive . . . from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable
of traveling on the public highways.”).
172. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.” (internal quotes omitted)).
173. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (finding that cell
phone searches generally require warrants and cannot be searched under the
arrest exception); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945 (finding the placement of a GPS
tracker on a vehicle to be a search); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (finding thermal imaging of the outside of the house to be a search).
174. See A High Heart Rate—What Can It Possibly Mean for You?, AZUMIO
(Jan. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.azumio.com/blog/health/high-heart
-rate-and-what-it-means (“A high heart rate can be due to many factors, such
as physical activity, panic, stress, or anxiety.”); Is Sex Exercise? And Is It Hard
on the Heart?, HARV. MED. PUBLICATIONS (June 1, 2011), http://www.health
.harvard.edu/newsletters_article/is-sex-exercise-and-is-it-hard-on-the-heart
(indicating that men’s heart rates increase during sexual activity, and that sex
ranks as moderate physical activity); Resting Heart Rate Table, TOPEND
SPORTS,
http://www.topendsports.com/testing/heart-rate-resting-chart.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (displaying resting heart rates with corresponding
fitness levels).
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175

cond. This certainly implicates activities within the home,
which Kyllo protected even when the home is not physically in176
vaded by law enforcement.
Therefore, while cell phones contain bank information,
177
communications with loved ones, and personal pictures, activity trackers contain highly personal heart rate information and
GPS data which together have the potential to indicate where
users travel and their emotional state while doing so. This is
the fundamental purpose of the activity tracker—not simply an
incidental function, as GPS data might be considered in the
context of cell phones.
c. Activity Trackers Hold Less Data than Cell Phones but the
Data Is Intensely Personal
Having looked at the types of data cell phones and activity
trackers tend to hold, it is prudent to also compare the storage
capacity of the devices. In Riley, the Court explicitly noted the
great quantity of data that can be held by modern cell
178
phones. Activity trackers hold notably less data than cell
179
phones. Still, these trackers have the capacity to hold several
180
days of very personal data. Additionally, some trackers are
designed to automatically delete (or more accurately, record
over) data after a certain number of days, whether or not the
181
data has been saved or uploaded to the Internet.
This follows naturally from the different purposes between
activity trackers and cell phones. Cell phones function as
175. See, e.g., Fitbit Help: How Do Fitbit Trackers Sync Their Data?,
http://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/How-do-Fitbit
FITBIT,
-trackers-sync-their-data (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
176. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
177. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing cell phone features and
storage capacity).
178. Id. (“The current top-selling smart phone has a standard capacity of
16 gigabytes (and is available with up to 64 gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes
translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of
videos.”).
179. Activity tracker storage information describes storage not in bytes but
in days or hours of data, so it is difficult to find a fair way to compare activity
trackers and cell phones, but it is likely that fitness trackers hold less data
than the average cell phone.
180. Fitbit Help, supra note 175 (“All Fitbit trackers can record detailed
minute-by-minute [calorie burn and sleep] data for seven days . . . [and] heart
rate data . . . for 30 days.”).
181. Id. (“Fitbit Surge can store a maximum of 35 hours of GPS data. If you
try to track more than 35 hours worth of GPS data without syncing, older data
will be deleted to make room for new data.”).
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stand-alone devices and therefore have high storage capaci182
ties. Activity trackers are designed to sync and upload data to
183
corresponding websites and accordingly need far less storage.
Activity trackers also do not present the often-confusing prob184
lem of allowing access to files stored on the cloud. The storage
capacity of activity trackers is fairly small, but the information
that they do hold is vital and personal.
However, the activity tracker context provides another avenue to address the difficult and as-yet unaddressed problem of
185
how data that is uploaded to the Internet should be treated,
because activity tracker companies design their devices to near186
ly require the uploading of data to associated websites. This
question is quite interesting in the context of activity trackers
because these websites are designed to be tools used by individual users, who have the ability to prevent their information
187
from reaching the eyes of other users. Nonetheless, the fact
that the data stored on activity trackers is likely regularly uploaded to the Internet means that under the Greenwood thirdparty standard, there can be no reasonable expectation of pri188
vacy in this data.

182. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. . . . One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity.”).
183. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
184. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (describing cloud computing as “the capacity
of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather
than on the device itself,” and indicating that this causes trouble for potential
searches, as data stored on the cloud may not be searched without a warrant,
but the officers may not know if it is stored locally or on the cloud).
185. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
186. It should be noted, of course, that if a wearer is perfectly happy just
viewing her daily statistics on the tracker itself each day, many trackers make
that a possibility. However, many of the trackers’ features are most useful
when viewed over several days’ time, and most trackers provide only a glimpse
at current statistics when users do not upload their data. See, e.g., App +
Dashboard, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/one#dashboard (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) (showing the Fitbit One screen, which shows a single statistic representative of the day or the moment at which the button is pressed).
187. One, supra note 3 (displaying data tracked through the Fitbit app on a
mobile device or the Fitbit website, which include activity and exercise,
weight, food intake, and sleep data).
188. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
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However, the Riley Court indicated a healthy respect for
the privacy implications digital data can hold, stating that “Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be found
on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s
189
private interests . . . .” Additionally, Justice Sotomayor suggested in her Jones concurrence that the Greenwood thirdparty standard needs to be readdressed because it is “ill suited
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carry190
ing out mundane tasks.” These statements were made regarding only the type of digital data collected on GPS devices
and cell phones, and the privacy interest would likely be enhanced in the case of activity trackers containing heart rate
trackers. This suggests that the intensely personal nature of
the data contained on activity trackers might trump its potential to be shared with others.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT NEED FOR EASILY WORKABLE RULES
The Court has clearly emphasized and prioritized the
workability of the rules law enforcement must follow, which often leads the Court to establish clear bright-line rules. Robinson describes police decisions as “quick ad hoc judgment[s]
which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
191
search” and created a bright-line rule allowing officers to
192
search all arrested persons at the time of arrest. Riley more
recently noted a preference for police workability, quoting precedent in stating, “[i]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be
done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fash193
ion by individual police officers.’” This practical sentiment led
the Court to determine that searching any digital data on cell
phones—not only data with unsearchable physical counter194
parts—requires a warrant.
Though bright-line rules may initially appear inflexible,
the Court often fashions exceptions where they are necessary.
189. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
190. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
191. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
192. Id. at 236.
193. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 705 n.19 (1981)) (omission in original).
194. Id. at 2495.
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Though the Court created Robinson as a bright-line rule, it was
willing to later make exceptions where the circumstances clearly necessitated different treatment, including an exception
based on time passed, an exception for arrestees who receive
only citations, and an exception stating that vehicles are to be
195
searched in narrower circumstances than other containers.
The Court has also exhibited a particular willingness to allow
the exigency exception to supersede bright-line rules. Even
when creating Riley’s bright-line rule requiring warrants to
search all digital data found on cell phones, the Court held that
arresting officers may still search digital data where exigent
196
circumstances would otherwise allow them to do so. It appears that the Court prefers to establish clear rules for practical purposes—bright-line rules are easy for officers to follow
while in the field, but officers can still employ the exigency exception to warrantless searches in extraordinary circumstances
197
on a case-by-case basis. Law enforcement agencies’ need for
workable rules to dictate officer conduct in typical situations,
as well as superseding exceptions to handle exceptional situations, should guide the solution to the activity tracker problem.
This need is especially applicable in the context of smart
wearables like activity trackers—“[i]n the coming world of lowcost wearable technology, requiring police officers to assess
every mobile device and render a binary decision as to its capa198
bilities before searching it will not work.” After all, ten years
ago no one knew that pedometers would be capable of storing
days’ worth of GPS and heart rate data. Today that is the
norm. In the future, when the “Internet of Things” becomes a
reality, courts and law enforcement agencies will absolutely require a simple bright-line rule that can be applied broadly to all
developing wearable technologies.

195. See supra Part I.B.1.
196. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
197. Id. (“The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine
whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular
case.”).
198. Patrick Brown, Note, Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: Overview of the Law as It Stands and a New Path Forward, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
563, 575 (2014).
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III. WHEN SEARCHING ARRESTEES’ EFFECTS INCIDENT
TO ARREST, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SHOULD
DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN PHYSICAL OBJECTS AND
DIGITAL DATA
Riley essentially recognized the innate differences between
physical objects, such as the cigarette package searched in Robinson, and digital containers like cell phones, which hold far
199
more than Robinson would have anticipated. Courts should
extend the cell phone exception to cover the digital data found
in activity trackers and similar devices because the government’s interest in the search incident to arrest exception does
not adequately outweigh the great degree of intrusion upon the
defendant’s privacy in the intensely private activity tracker da200
ta.
The ideal solution is for courts and law enforcement officers to adopt a two-tiered approach that considers separately the
authority of officers to search the physical object and the digital
data it contains. Under such an approach, the physical aspects
of any digital container may be searched warrantlessly when it
is found incident to a lawful arrest, but to access the digital data these containers hold, officers would need to secure a warrant. This solution is strongly supported by both case law and
policy concerns. By recognizing the distinction between physical and digital evidence as Riley’s essential holding, courts can
ensure that all digital data is protected adequately and immediately. Until courts explicitly hold that Riley applies evenly to
all smart devices, an argument can still be made that Riley applies solely to cell phones, and courts will be forced to analyze
each device and its similarities and dissimilarities to cell
phones. As demonstrated by various courts’ application of Riley
to digital cameras and credit cards, this type of individual
analysis breeds inconsistency and is a waste of judicial resources.
This Part describes that under this two-tiered framework,
arresting officers have the capacity to physically examine the
external case and body of the activity tracker without first obtaining a warrant. This Part goes on to explain that conversely,
199. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“A search of the information on a cell phone
bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.”).
200. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (indicating that
searches must be assessed by balancing legitimate government interests
against the degree of intrusion upon an individual’s privacy).
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officers must obtain warrants to search digital data on activity
trackers. This Part will then explain that the exigency exception will continue to allow officers to search through the data
when they believe that the data will be deleted otherwise. Finally, this Part will caution that adequate training of law enforcement officers is crucial for the protection of arrestees’ private data.
A. PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS OF ACTIVITY TRACKERS MAY BE
PERFORMED WARRANTLESSLY
Though there is no danger of injury from the digital data
contained within these devices, law enforcement officers should
be able to physically examine these devices. These physical
searches should be brief inspections of the physical device it201
self, for the purpose of ensuring that it is not a weapon and
does not contain any weapons within it or its accompanying
202
case, such as pins or razor blades.
Problematically, in such a physical inspection, law enforcement officers might not recognize activity trackers because
these devices are not yet nearly as prevalent as cell phones in
203
our society and they may not all be easily recognizable as be204
ing activity trackers. This means an officer might access digital information by clicking the button on the device and viewing the user’s daily statistics, possibly without even realizing
what data she is accessing. While clicking the button of an unknown device to ensure its functionality and that it is not merely a shell concealing a weapon might be considered acceptable,
toggling through daily statistics would constitute a search requiring a warrant in much the same way that searching

201. One could see, for example, why a shoe-based tracker like the
SmartMove shoe insole, see Truong, supra note 4, could arouse suspicions in
light of at least one attempted shoe bombing. See Shoe Bomber: Tale of Another Failed Terrorist Attack, CNN (Dec. 25, 2009, 10:23 PM EST), http://www
.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/25/richard.reid.shoe.bomber.
202. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (allowing officers, for example, to “determine
whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that even when finding envelopes, the Robinson standard would allow
a search for safety purposes in case pins or razor blades were hidden within).
203. See supra Part II.A.1. But see Rettner, supra note 121 (indicating the
rapid growth of the activity tracker market).
204. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (wristband); One, supra note 3 (clip-on device); Truong, supra note 4 (shoe insole).
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through text messages or photos on a cell phone would require
205
a warrant.
Law enforcement agencies should seek to avoid unconstitutional searches, and brief training on the available types of
wearable technology might go a long way towards this goal. In
the wake of Riley, law enforcement agencies should thoroughly
train their officers as to existing wearables, including smart activity trackers, and the data these devices are capable of holding. Such training need not be lengthy, and could be done in the
form of a handout or an email, provided officers were required
to read it. However, such training should be updated fairly frequently for two reasons. First, it will increase officer understanding of what they may lawfully search at the time of arrest,
and as a result will protect the civil liberties of those searched
incident to arrest. Second, this training, if kept up-to-date, will
ensure that arresting officers realize the potential treasure
troves of relevant evidence at their fingertips and apply for
warrants in a timely manner to ensure that data is gathered.
B. TO SEARCH DIGITAL DATA, OFFICERS MUST OBTAIN
WARRANTS ABSENT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Digital data on activity trackers should be protected as
much as possible from warrantless searches because it is deeply personal information. This Section explains that generally
officers should not be allowed to search this digital data without acquiring a warrant. However, this Section will go on to explain that the exigent circumstances exception might be used
more often for activity trackers than for cell phones and will
provide officers with the necessary discretion to warrantlessly
search in emergency situations.
1. Officers Generally May Not Search Digital Data Without a
Warrant
Some activity trackers contain incredibly personal data, in206
cluding heart rate and GPS data. While some smart activity
207
trackers hold less important data than others, each new de208
vice collects more advanced types of data. Additionally, the
205. See infra Part III.B.1.
206. See, e.g., Charge HR, supra note 11 (heart rate); Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (GPS).
207. See, e.g., Zip, supra note 3 (tracking only steps, calorie burn, distance
traveled, and relative activity).
208. See supra Part I.E (describing the historical development of Fitbit, the
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discrepancy between high-tech and low-tech activity trackers is
comparable to that seen in Riley’s smart phone and Wurie’s flip
209
phone. The Court created a bright-line rule for all cell phones,
not just smart phones. For the same reasons, courts and law
enforcement officers should protect all activity trackers by requiring a warrant to access any digital data on an activity
tracker. Either connecting the tracker to a computer or manually toggling through this data on the tracker itself would con210
stitute a search and would require a warrant.
One could argue that only the more personal forms of data
should be protected, allowing officers to access step count or
flights of stairs climbed without a warrant. However, this is
impractical for two reasons. First, this would require officers to
determine, at the time of arrest, which pieces of information
are private and are not. This is a difficult determination to
make in a split second, and would not produce a workable
211
rule. Second, the physical nature of activity trackers would
make such a rule even less workable. These trackers tend to
have a single button allowing the data to come across the
212
screen one by one, or do not have screens and require an upload to a computer, which instantly uploads all information
213
from the tracker, unlimited by time or type.
An argument that law enforcement officers should be allowed to warrantlessly search digital data if they would be able
214
to search the physical counterpart was also rejected in Riley.
Not only does this fail to provide a workable rule for law en215
forcement, but also many of the types of data collected and
leading producer of activity trackers).
209. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014) (describing
Riley’s smart phone as having “a broad range of other functions” and Wurie’s
flip phone as having “a smaller range of features”).
210. Cf. id. at 2492–93 (finding that looking through data on the phone itself was an unreasonable search where no warrant was obtained beforehand).
211. See id. at 2491 (stating the Court’s “general preference to provide
clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules”); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (indicating these decisions are “quick ad
hoc judgment[s]”).
212. See Charge HR, supra note 11; One, supra note 3; Specifications: Display, supra note 167; Zip, supra note 3; supra note 167 and accompanying
text.
213. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; Up, supra note 2.
214. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (discussing this argument in the
context of cell phones).
215. Id. (objecting to the bulk of data that could be recovered and stating
such a test would require “a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine
which digital files are comparable to physical records,” leaving it “[un]clear
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stored on activity trackers have no non-digital counterpart.
Courts would be forced to first determine non-digital counterparts for each type of data—for instance, is a map a non-digital
counterpart of GPS data, or must it be manually labeled with
timestamps?—and second, determine whether the substitute
would be protected. Such a process would take far too long to be
a workable rule for law enforcement officers.
Finally, it should be noted that the process of actually obtaining warrants need not be seen as a barrier—in fact, the efficiency of this process in the modern world was noted in Ri216
ley. Warrants for these devices would, of course, face some
217
challenges, but this is true of all warrants for digital data, including the cell phone warrants prescribed by Riley. The fact
that the warrant application process is in flux should be no
barrier to this workable and practical solution.
2. The Exigency Exception Would Enable Officers To Search
Digital Data on Activity Trackers in Emergency Circumstances
218

Despite the speed at which warrants can be obtained, the
Court found in Riley that across-the-board rules without explicit exceptions do not adequately protect officer safety, and therefore found that officers were entitled to search digital data on
219
cell phones in exigent circumstances. Due to the fairly similar
nature of activity trackers to cell phones, officers should be able
how officers could make these kinds of decisions before conducting a search, or
how courts would apply the proposed rule”).
216. Id. (indicating that in some jurisdictions warrants can be requested
via iPad and can be signed and returned to the officer on the scene within fifteen minutes of the request).
217. See, e.g., James Saylor, Note, Computers As Castles: Preventing the
Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2847 (2011) (describing the conflict of reconciling
the plain view exception, allowing officers to use anything in plain view, with
modern searches of digital data where all data is downloaded at once). For a
discussion of what such warrants should look like, see generally Andrew D.
Huynh, Note, What Comes After “Get a Warrant”: Balancing Particularity and
Practicality in Mobile Device Search Warrants Post-Riley, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 187 (2015), and Paul M. Ervasti, Is the Particularity Requirement of the
Fourth Amendment Particular Enough for Digital Evidence?, ARMY LAW., Oct.
2015, at 3, 3.
218. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
219. Id. at 2486 (“[T]he interest in protecting officer safety does not justify
dispensing with the warrant requirement across the board. To the extent dangers to arresting officers may be implicated in a particular way in a particular
case, they are better addressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the one for exigent circumstances.”).
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to rely on the exigency exception to search digital data on the
scene under exceptional circumstances.
For illustrative purposes, imagine that officers have been
investigating a cocaine smuggling ring and have pinpointed one
suspect whom they believe to be involved. Officers believe, from
the patterns of cocaine availability in the community, that the
suspect meets with the kingpin of the ring on Sundays at a consistent time and location. The officers believe if they can determine the location of these meetings, they will be able to use
that information to identify other members of the ring. Suppose
the suspect is arrested on a Monday afternoon wearing an activity tracker with GPS data that is automatically deleted every twenty-four hours. In that instance, arresting officers might
not be able to afford waiting to obtain a warrant—the suspect
likely visited the location in question within 24 hours and the
relevant data has the potential to be deleted within minutes.
Those officers, under the two-tiered approach, would be allowed
under the exigency exception to download the data before it
was deleted in order to find the location of the meeting place of
the drug smugglers. Thus, when there is probable cause to believe that evidence on the tracker will be destroyed or deleted,
as in the case of heart rate data that will be deleted in seven
220
days, officers should be allowed to access the data before a
warrant can be obtained and before the data will be lost.
It is important to note that without officer training, the
good faith exception could swallow the rule by allowing activity
tracker data gathered during improperly warrantless searches
to be presented at trial where the law enforcement officer be221
lieved in good faith that he could search the device. An officer
who knows only that wearables contain helpful information and
that some of them delete their data on a periodic basis might
mistakenly search all wearables for fear of destruction of evidence. For this reason, training is all the more important. It
may be wise for courts to bar introduction of evidence where
such evidence is admissible only under the good faith exception
and the officer had not been properly trained regarding smart
wearables. This would strongly encourage law enforcement
agencies to ensure that their officers were properly trained.
220. See Fitbit Help, supra note 175 (indicating that some data is deleted
as soon as thirty-five hours after it is collected, while some remains on the device for several weeks).
221. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (considering
the implications of officer training with regards to the good faith exception).
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The exigency exception will therefore prevent the two-tiered
approach from tying the hands of law enforcement in circumstances in which officers have no choice but to either access the
222
data or see it lost forever.
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE TWO-TIERED SOLUTION
CANNOT PREVAIL
Several potential counterarguments to this Note’s proposal
to protect activity tracker data can be predicted. Still, no counterargument unseats the two-tiered approach as the most logical way to approach searches of activity tracker data.
First, some might suggest that data of activity trackers is
223
not accurate enough to warrant protection. There have not
yet been any court determinations of the accuracy of activity
tracker evidence, or how strongly such data may be relied upon.
Heart rate data in particular can be critiqued on the following
basis: even if a heart rate is high, it is not clear why it is ele224
vated. Such a reliability determination is outside the scope of
this Note. It should be noted, however, that in a civil suit in
Canada, Fitbit data has been used to support a personal injury
225
claim. Moreover, law enforcement has relied on Fitbit data in
226
at least one prosecution, and the government has requested
activity tracker data from at least one activity tracker producer, indicating that law enforcement officers think this information is valuable in some contexts, whether or not it will be
227
admissible in court. Additionally, it is important that courts
222. Additionally, it may be possible in such circumstances for law enforcement officers to subpoena the related companies for the desired information. See Gabriel R. Schlabach, Note, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic
Theory and the Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677, 679–80
(2015) (indicating that even where law enforcement officers can and do acquire
information through this process, the result is a “mosaic” of the data).
223. See Elizabeth Murray, Fitbit Lawsuit Alleges Heart Rate Monitors Are
Inaccurate, Misleading, TODAY (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:40 AM), http://www
.today.com/health/fitbit-lawsuit-alleges-heart-rate-monitors-are-inaccurate
-misleading-t65956 (describing a recent lawsuit brought by Fitbit customers
against the company, claiming that its heart rate trackers do not always
properly display accurate heart rates).
224. See sources cited supra note 173 (suggesting the Supreme Court would
likely find heart rate data private).
225. See Alexander Howard, How Data from Wearable Tech Can Be Used
Against You in a Court of Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2015, 2:41 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexander-howard/how-data-from-wearable-te_
b_7698764.html.
226. See Schooler, supra note 131.
227. See Lee, supra note 136 (indicating that Fitbit has received requests
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not allow any perceived inaccuracy of modern day activity
trackers to prevent law enforcement officers from using data
from future, more advanced, and technically accurate devices.
Second, critics might argue that activity trackers do not
hold enough data to earn the same protection as cell phones. No
matter the quantity of data on activity tracker, it is so compre228
hensive that it must be protected. Riley emphasized that cell
229
phone data “form[s] a revealing montage of the user’s life.”
The GPS, heart rate, calorie burn, flights of stairs, and other
data found on activity trackers similarly would allow law enforcement officers to reassemble the user’s life. This data
should therefore be protected.
Finally, critics might suggest that protection is not needed
because some activity trackers automatically delete their data
after a certain amount of days. It is crucial to note, however,
that in the modern world, a warrant can be obtained in as little
230
as fifteen minutes. Arguments that activity trackers’ automatic deletion of data should entitle the officer to a warrantless
search are therefore unlikely to be persuasive in most circum231
stances.
A two-tiered approach with separate requirements for
searching the physical object and the digital data it contains is
the ideal flexible solution to cover all wearables, including
smart activity trackers. Employing such a standard would require officer training to recognize wearables and search their
exteriors for concealed weapons while refraining from searching their digital contents. This training would also teach officers about the types of data that can be held by various wearables and the importance of obtaining a timely search warrant to
access this potentially invaluable data. This solution therefore

from law enforcement agencies for data of individual customers).
228. See Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment:
The Implications of Riley v. California, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 329 n.86
(noting that some “might try to argue that sensors collecting a single category
of information should not be encompassed under Riley’s rationale, but the
comprehensive nature of that information” causes it to fit under the Riley umbrella).
229. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
230. See id. at 2493.
231. It is also crucial to note that with the training this Note recommends,
officers should be more likely to know which trackers delete their data within
hours rather than weeks. Additionally, they would be more likely to know
whether a particular activity tracker will soon delete the relevant data, and
thus know whether exigent circumstances truly exist.
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maximizes individual privacy rights, officer safety, and law enforcement productivity.
CONCLUSION
In Riley, the Court held that cell phones were meaningfully
different from non-digital objects found on arrestees in searches
incident to arrests due to the type and quality of data they are
capable of holding. In holding that searching cell phones found
incident to arrest requires a warrant, the Court indicated that
digital data was qualitatively different from physical objects
found during pat downs. After the Court decided Riley, smart
activity trackers have continued to gain popularity and their
features continue to advance. Now that Riley has suggested at
least some digital data is given more zealous protection than
physical objects, law enforcement officers need a standard for
how and when smart activity trackers and other wearables may
be searched at the scene of arrest and when a warrant is required.
The best way to resolve this problem is to create a twotiered approach distinguishing between searches of physical objects and the digital data they contain. Such an approach would
allow officers to inspect the physical activity trackers for potential danger, but not to look through or search digital data before obtaining a warrant to do so. In a circumstance in which
the officer believes that exigent circumstances exist in the form
of inevitable deletion of evidence relevant to the crime of arrest,
the officer is free to access the data and the courts can later address her actions. Finally, government entities and officers
must be made aware of the wide array of smart devices that exist, including smart activity trackers. Awareness and understanding of these devices will be key to appropriately balancing
government interests and citizen privacy.

